We used two experiments to investigate factors related to error in output monitoring. In the learning phase, participants were presented with several action phrases from either an internal source (imagine) or an external source (enact). In the recall test phase, participants were asked to recollect as many action phrases as possible. In the output monitoring test phase, participants were asked to judge whether they had recalled each item during the recall test phase. The first and second experiments differed only in the type of recollection participants used (enact vs. imagine). We found that repeated enacting during the learning phase increased output monitoring error under conditions where participants counted numerals as a secondary task during the recall test phase (experiments 1A, 2A) and under conditions where the output monitoring test phase was conducted seven days after the recall test phase (experiments 1B, 2B). These results reveal that when participants were unable to use conscious recollection during the recall test phase, they did not rely on source memory but only relied on the strength of the memory.
Individuals sometimes do not remember if they have already done something that they had planned to do. Consequently, they may repeat an action that has already been performed or neglect to do something that was planned (Norman, 1981) . These errors are related to output monitoring, which is the process by which people distinguish what was or was not done (Koriat & Ben-Zur, 1988) . It is a memory of past memory performance. In this study, we investigated factors related to output monitoring error.
In previous studies of output monitoring (Gardiner & Klee, 1976; Gardiner, Passmore, & Herriot, 1977) , participants performed a series of word tests related to short recall or recognition. After completing the tests, participants were supplied with the items they had studied for an output monitoring test in which they were asked to provide a yes/ no response to whether they had previously been asked to recall (or recognize) each item. In this way, the studies assessed participant memory of past memory performance. In their tests, Gardiner and colleagues (1977) used words as the study materials.
In contrast, Sugimori, Nakanishi, Komeda, Tsunemi, & Kusumi (2005) used action phrases and investigated the effects of previously encoded action phrases on output monitoring error. This experimental paradigm consisted of three phases: learning, recall test, and output monitoring test. In the learning phase, several action phrases were presented from either an internal (imagined) or external source (enacted). In the recall test phase, participants were asked to recollect action phrases and perform the ones they remembered; participants performed some action phrases and forgot to perform others. In the output monitoring test phase, items were presented sequentially, and participants were asked to judge whether they had recalled (performed) the action during the recall test phase.
For example, suppose that the action phrase was locking the front door. The learning phase would involve either locking a door (enacting) or imagining locking (imagining) the door, the recall test phase would involve successfully locking the door or failing to lock the door during the recall test, and the output monitoring test phase would involve the participant judging whether he or she locked the door on that occasion. Even if the participant failed to lock the door during the recall test phase, no omission error was recorded if the failure was correctly identified. Thus, a correct judgment was the key factor during the output monitoring test phase.
In an investigation of factors related to output monitoring error, Sugimori et al. (2005) found that errors increased under conditions of both repeated enacting during the learning phase and numeral counting as a divided attention task during the recall test phase. This combination resulted in participants judging action phrases as "recollected," even if they had failed to perform them during the recall test phase. When participants did not perform the divided attention task (counting numerals) during the recall test phase, they correctly distinguished what they had or had not recalled. Many action studies share a fundamental finding: participants remember action phrases better when they are acted out (subject-performed tasks: SPTs) than when they are only imagined (Cohen, 1989; Emgelkamp, 1998; Nilsson, 2000) . This finding can also be applied to output monitoring; when participants do not have to perform a divided attention task as a secondary task, they are able to correctly remember what they did or failed to do during the recall test phase.
In this study, we further investigated factors related to output monitoring error. Previous studies have found that participants performing a divided attention task exhibit reduced ability to consciously recollect (Jacoby, Woloshyn, & Kelley, 1989) . In an investigation of the effects of divided attention on familiarity versus conscious recollection, Jacoby, Woloshyn, et al. (1989) applied a task requiring participants to judge whether a name was famous. The task consisted of learning and test phases. In the learning phase, participants read a list of names; in the test phase, old (previously presented) names, new famous names, and new non-famous names were presented in sequence, and participants were required to judge whether the names were famous.
Participants correctly judged fame when the test phase was conducted soon after the learning phase and participants had not performed a divided attention task. In contrast, participants who had performed a divided attention task during the learning phase were more likely to judge a name as "famous." The result was similar when the test phase was conducted a day after the learning phase (Jacoby, Kelley, & Brown, 1989) . Thus, both divided attention during the learning phase and delayed testing reduced the ability of participants to recognize a name as previously presented, but had no effect on the increased name familiarity caused by prior presentation.
In short, both divided attention tasks performed during the learning phase and delayed testing greatly influence conscious recollection. Applying these findings to the new paradigm of output monitoring, Sugimori et al. (2005) found that participants who had performed a divided attention task were unable to recollect having performed the action phrase during the recall test phase. If the findings from the "famous" task are applied to the new paradigm, output monitoring error should also occur if the output monitoring test phase is conducted 7 days after the recall test phase.
In this study, we investigated whether both divided attention tasks performed during the learning phase and delayed testing significantly affect conscious recollection in output monitoring, as they did in the "famous" task. If output monitoring error is caused by the lack of conscious memory, as it was in "famous" task judgments, repeating the action phrase in the learning phase may have a residual effect on its familiarity and an unconscious influence on memory.
Experiment 1 tested the effects of unconscious familiarity on output monitoring error when conscious memory is lacking. In this case, output monitoring error occurred when a participant judged an action phrase as "recollected," even though the participant failed to perform the action during the recall test phase. Experiment 1A replicated a test conducted by Sugimori et al. (2005) , in which attention levels (full vs. divided) were manipulated in the recall test phase to confirm that output monitoring error required both repeated enactment during the learning phase and a divided attention task (counting numerals) during the recall test phase. Experiment 1B manipulated the time interval (immediate vs. 7-day delay) between the recall test and output monitoring test phases to confirm that delayed monitoring also reduces the ability to consciously recollect.
Experiments 1A and 1B tested the hypothesis that error in output monitoring occurs only when participants are unable to consciously recollect what they have done in the recall test phase; that is, output monitoring errors are related to the lack of conscious recollection and the use of unconscious familiarity. Experiment 2 further investigated the use of unconscious familiarity by creating a condition in which participants could not consciously recollect what they had or had not done and examined whether they relied on the source or the strength of the earlier stored memory. In the recall test phase, participants imagined rather than enacted action phrases. In recall test phases in everyday life, individuals rarely only imagine action phrases, but this manipulation was important to investigate how unconscious memory influences output monitoring. We made two predictions. First, if participants used the source of the earlier stored memory to determine whether they had performed an action, repeated imagining during the learning phase should increase errors in output monitoring, causing participants to judge action phrases as "imagined," even though they had failed to imagine the phrases during the recall test phase (Prediction 1). Second, if participants did not use source memory, but instead used only the relative strength of the memory, repeated enacting during the learning phase should increase the memory strength more than repeated imagining. As a result, repeated enacting during the learning phase should increase error in output monitoring error, causing participants to judge action phrases as "imagined," even though they had failed to imagine the phrases during the recall test phase (Prediction 2).
We manipulated attention levels (full/divided) during the recall test phase of Experiment 2A and time intervals between the recall and output monitoring test phases (immediate/7-day delay) in Experiment 2B. These manipulations corresponded to those used in Experiment 1.
EXPERIMENT 1A

METHOD
Participants. Twenty-eight undergraduates participated in the study; each was tested individually and received 500 yen (about US$5). All subjects participated under both the full-and divided-attention conditions of the recall test phase. The condition order was counterbalanced (first full attention and second divided attention, or first divided attention and second full attention).
Design. The experiment had a 2 (learning phase source: imagining or enacting) × 3 (learning phase frequency of presentation: 0, 1, or 3 times) × 2 (recall test phase attention: full or divided) design, all manipulated within-subject.
Materials. We presented a total of 100 action phrases (e.g., wave your arm, swing your hip, and scratch your head; Kanashiki, 2000) . The action phrases were divided into two groups: 50 were presented under the full-attention condition, and the other 50 under the divided-attention condition. During the learning phase, we manipulated the learning method (enacting/imagining) and frequency (0, 1, or 3 presentations). Of the 50 phrases, 10 were allotted to each of the five conditions (Appendix A).
Action phrases were presented in random order, with the restriction that the same phrase was not presented more than twice in succession. Each participant was tested under both full-and divided-attention conditions. Participants were tested under the full-attention condition in the first session and the dividedattention condition in the second session or vice versa, with a 7-day interval between the two sessions. All conditions were counterbalanced.
Procedure. Experiment 1A consisted of two sessions. One included the secondary task (dividedattention condition), whereas the other did not (full-attention condition).
On the first day, the learning, recall, and output monitoring test phases were conducted under one of the two conditions (with or without the secondary task in the recall test phase). During the learning phase, participants either enacted or imagined 10 phrases once or three times. In total, 40 action phrases were presented to each participant 80 times.
After a 1-sec presentation of a fixation point, an action phrase was presented for 1.5 sec, followed by either an enacting or imagining trial. In an enacting trial, the word "enact" was presented for 2 sec. Participants were instructed to read the phase aloud and to enact the phrase for the entire 2 sec. In an imagining trial, the word "imagine" was displayed for 2 sec. Participants were instructed to read the phase aloud and to imagine enacting the phrase for the entire 2 sec.
The recall test phase occurred immediately after the learning phase. Participants were instructed to speak aloud and enact all the action phrases they could remember. Under the full-attention condition, participants concentrated only on the recall test task, while under the divided-attention condition, participants were asked to count numerals as a secondary task.
The output monitoring test phase was conducted immediately after the recall test phase. During the output monitoring test phase, 50 action phrases, including unlearned items, were presented in sequence. For each action phrase, participants were asked to judge if it was not presented in the learning phase, presented in the learning phase but not recollected in the recall test phase, or presented in the learning phase and recollected in the recall test phase. The task was presented on a computer screen; each action phrase was displayed in the upper portion of the screen, and three buttons labeled "recollected," "forgot to recollect," or "not learned" were displayed in the lower portion.
Seven days after this test, participants returned to the lab and performed the learning, recall, and output monitoring test phases under the other condition (full or divided attention during the recall test phase).
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Recollection during the recall test phase. Table 1 , row 1 summarizes the recall test phase data as the proportion of recollection (enacting) in the recall test phase. As shown in row 1, no significant three-way interaction existed among the source and frequency of presentation in the learning phase and the attention level during the recall test phase (F(2, 54) = 2.43, MSE = 0.02, n.s.). Significant differences resulted from the source in the learning phase (imagining or enacting; F(1, 27) = 15.65, MSE = 0.03, p < .01), the frequency of presentation in the learning phase (0, 1, or 3 presentations; F(2, 54) = 7.88, MSE = 0.02, p < .01), and the attention level during the recall test phase (divided or full; F(1, 27) = 9.97, MSE = 0.03, p < .01).
The recollection proportion can be considered the memory strength. When action phrases were learned repeatedly both from the enacted and imagined source, encoded memory strength increased. The memory strength of items learned from the enacted source was greater than that from the imagined source. Furthermore, when we introduced the secondary task of counting numerals, participants had more difficulty recalling action phrases.
Misattribution to "recollected." Figure 1 shows the proportion of responses in the output monitoring test phase for phrases not recollected (enacted) in the recall test phase. We classified the action phrases that participants failed to recollect during the recall test phase into three categories: correctly attributed to "forgot to recollect," misattributed to "recollected," and misattributed to "new."
Misattribution to "recollected," after participants failed to recollect in the recall test phase, led to errors of omission. We found a three-way interaction among learning method, frequency of presentation in the learning phase, and attention levels in the recall test phase (F(2, 54) = 3.01, MSE = 0.01, p < .05).
Under the full-attention condition, we found no statistical differences between the learning method and frequency of presentation in the learning phase. Under the dividedattention condition, we found a significant interaction between the learning method and frequency of presentation in the learning phase (F(2, 54) = 3.29, MSE = 0.02, p < .05). The frequency of presentation had a significant main effect (F(2, 54) = 6.14, MSE = 0.03, p < .01) on enacting in the learning phase, but not on imagining. Thus, error in output monitoring increased only when participants counted numerals as a secondary task in the recall test phase (divided-attention condition). Furthermore, in the learning phase, only repeated enacting increased output monitoring error; participants misattributed the action phrases as "recollected," even though they had failed to recollect the phrases in the recall test phase. Imagining did not increase this error.
EXPERIMENT 1B
METHOD
Participants. Fourteen undergraduates participated in this experiment, and all were assigned to the delayed-test condition. Design. The experiment had a 2 (learning phase source: imagining or enacting) × 3 (learning phase presentation frequency: 0, 1, or 3 times) design, all manipulated within-subject.
Materials. This experiment used the same action phrases as Experiment 1A (Kanashiki, 2000) ; 50 action phrases were used for each participant.
Procedure. As Experiment 1B consisted of one session under the full-attention condition, the recall test phase did not include the secondary task. The learning and recall test phases were conducted on the first day. Seven days later, participants returned to the lab and took part in the output monitoring test phase. Learning, recollecting, and monitoring conditions were the same as in Experiment 1A, except in Experiment 1B the monitoring test phase was conducted 7 days after the recall test phase.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Recollection in the recall test phase. Table 2 , row 1 summarizes the recall test phase data. No significant interaction was found between the learning phase source and frequency of presentation (F(2, 26) = 0.88, MSE = 0.02, n.s.). Significant differences were found between the learning phase source (imagining or enacting) and frequency of presentation (0, 1, or 3 times). These results are similar to those of Experiment 1A; encoded memory strength increased when action phrases were repeated in the learning phase by either enacting or imagining. The memory strength of items learned by enacting was also greater than that of imagining.
"Recollected" judgments. Figure 2 shows the proportion of responses in the output monitoring test phase for phrases not recollected (enacted) in the recall test phase. We found a relationship between the learning method and frequency of presentation during the learning phase (F(2, 26) = 3.01, MSE = 0.01, p < 0.05). When action phrases were enacted in the learning phase, misattribution to "recollected" increased with the frequency of enacting. However, this pattern was not observed when participants imagined the action phrases.
These results indicate that repeated enacting, but not imagining, during the learning phase increases errors in output monitoring. Furthermore, errors in output monitoring increased when the output monitoring test phase was delayed 7 days after the recall test phase.
Thus, Experiments 1A and 1B indicate that conscious memory about the recall test phase decreased when attention was divided during the recall test phase or when the monitoring test phase was delayed 7 days after the recall test phase. Enacting an action phrase three times in the learning phase interfered with memory and increased output monitoring errors. In contrast, repeated imagining during the learning phase did not increase output monitoring errors.
Next, we examined why repeated imagining during the learning phase did not interfere with memory in the recall test phase of Experiment 1. We had two hypotheses. First, in Experiment 1, the memory source in the recall test phase was enacting, which was likely to interfere with memory. Second, the memory strength of enacting was stronger than that of imagining, so enacting was likely to interfere with memory. Therefore, Experiment 2 investigated whether participants judged their past memory performance based on source memory or only memory strength.
The procedure for Experiment 2 was the same as that for Experiment 1, except for the recall test phase method. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to enact what they had learned and remembered, whereas in Experiment 2, participants were asked to imagine this. If participants unconsciously relied on source memory, repeated imagining during the learning phase should increase output monitoring error. If participants did not rely on source memory but relied only on the relative strength of the memory, repeated enacting during the learning phase should increase error in output monitoring.
EXPERIMENT 2A
METHOD
Participants. Participants comprised 28 undergraduates who were tested individually. Each received 500 yen (about US$5). All subjects participated under both the full-and divided-attention conditions of the recall test phase.
Design. This experiment had the same design as Experiment 1A: a 2 (learning phase source: imagining or enacting) × 3 (learning phase presentation frequency: 0, 1, or 3 times) × 2 (recall test phase attention: full or divided) design, manipulated all within-subject.
Materials. The experiment used the same 100 action phrases as Experiment 1A (Kanashiki, 2000) . Procedure. This experiment used the same procedure as Experiment 1A, except for the type of recollection during the recall test phase.
On day 1, the learning, recall test, and output monitoring test phases were conducted under one of two conditions (with/without the secondary task in the recall test phase). During the learning phase, 10 phrases were either enacted or imagined once or three times each.
The recall test phase was conducted immediately after the learning phase. Participants were instructed to speak aloud and imagine (not enact) all of the action phrases they could remember. Under the full-attention condition, participants were able to concentrate on the recall test task, while under the divided-attention condition, they were asked to count numerals as a secondary task. The output monitoring test phase was conducted immediately after the recall test phase.
Seven days later, participants returned to the lab, and the learning, recall test, and output monitoring test phases were conducted under the other condition (full or divided attention in the recall test phase). 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Recollection in the recall test phase. Table 1 , row 2 summarizes the recall test phase data. This table presents the proportion of recollection (imagining) in the recall test phase. As shown in row 3, no significant three-way interaction existed among the learning phase source, presentation frequency, and recall test phase attention level (F(2, 54) = 1.06, MSE = 0.02, n.s.). Significant differences were found in the learning phase (imagining or enacting; F(1, 27) = 13.74, MSE = 0.02, p < .01), presentation frequency during the learning phase (0, 1, or 3 times; F(2, 54) = 10.44, MSE = 0.01, p < .01), and attention level during the recall test phase (divided or full; F(1, 27) = 9.98, MSE = 0.03, p < .01).
The recollection proportion can be considered memory strength. Thus, when action phrase learning was repeated from either the enacting or imagining source, encoded memory strength increased. The memory strength of items learned from enacting was greater than that from imagining. Furthermore, participants who counted numerals as a secondary task found it more difficult to remember action phrases.
Misattribution to "recollected." Figure 3 presents the proportion of responses in the output monitoring test phase for phrases not recollected (imagined) during the recall test phase. We classified the action phrases that participants failed to recollect during the recall test phase into three categories: correctly attributed to "forgot to recollect," misattributed to "recollected," and misattributed to "new."
Misattribution to "recollected," which occurred when participants failed to recollect during the recall test phase, led to errors of omission. We found a three-way interaction among learning methods, presentation frequency in the learning phase, and attention level during the recall test phase (F(2, 54) = 5.41, MSE = 0.01, p < .05).
Under the full-attention condition, we found no statistical difference between the learning method and presentation frequency in the learning phase. Under the divided- attention condition, we found a significant interaction between the learning method and presentation frequency in the learning phase (F(2, 54) = 3.47, MSE = 0.01, p < .05). Presentation frequency had a significant main effect on enacting in the learning phase (F(2, 54) = 5.64, MSE = 0.01, p < .01), but no similar significant effect for imagining in the learning phase. These results show that in the learning phase, repeated enacting, but not imagining, increased output monitoring errors when participants counted numerals as a secondary task in the recall test phase (divided-attention condition).
EXPERIMENT 2B
METHOD Participants. Fourteen undergraduates participated in the experiment, with all assigned to the delayedtest condition.
Procedure. The procedure for Experiment 2B was the same as that for Experiment 1B, except for the type of recollection during the recall test phase: participants were instructed to speak aloud and imagine (not enact) all of the action phrases they could remember.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Recollection in the recall test phase. Table 2 , row 2 summarizes the recall test phase data. No significant interaction was found in the learning phase between the source and the presentation frequency (F(2, 26) = -0.65, MSE = 0.02, n.s.). Significant differences existed between the learning phase source (imagining or enacting; F(1, 13) = 9.98, MSE = 0.01, p < .01) and presentation frequency (0, 1, or 3 times; F(2, 26) = 11.45, MSE = 0.02, p < .01). When action phrases were repeated in the learning phase from either the enacting or imagining source, encoded memory strength increased. The memory strength of items learned from enacting was greater than that from imagining.
"Recollected" judgments. Figure 4 shows the proportion of responses in the output monitoring test phase for phrases not recollected (enacted) in the recall test phase. We found an interaction in the learning phase between the learning method and presentation frequency (F(2, 26) = 4.97, MSE = 0.01, p < .01). When action phrases were enacted in the learning phase, misattribution to "recollected" increased as the frequency of enacting increased. However, this pattern was not observed when action phrases were imagined during the learning phase.
These results indicate that repeated enacting, but not imagining, during the learning phase increased output monitoring errors when the output monitoring test phase was conducted 7 days after the recall test phase. Although both repeated enacting and imagining during the learning phase increased memory strength, the memory strength of items from imagining repeated three times was almost the same as that from enacting only once (See the proportion of correct recollections in Table1 and Table2). Thus, participants did not rely on source memory but only on relative memory strength, leading to increased output monitoring errors for repeated enacting during the learning phase.
Although the type of recollection used in Experiment 2 differed from that in Experiment 1 (imagine vs. enact), the experiment produced identical results. Therefore, we concluded that when participants are unable to use conscious recollection in the recall test phase, they rely only on memory strength, not source memory.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In Experiments 1 and 2, we investigated factors related to output monitoring error. Based on results from the recall test phase, in which participants enacted in Experiment 1 and imagined in Experiment 2, we concluded that repeated enacting in the learning phase increases output monitoring errors. This was also the case when participants counted numerals as a secondary task in the recall test phase (Experiments 1A and 2A) and when the output monitoring test phase was conducted 7 days after the recall test phase (Experiments 1B and 2B). Although both repeated enacting and imagining during the learning phase increase memory strength, the proportion of correct recollections was highest when action phrases were enacted three times. The proportion of correct recollections when action phrases were imagined three times was almost same as that for enacting only once. These results indicate that when participants are unable to use conscious recollection in the recall test phase, they rely only on relative memory strength, not source memory.
Many previous studies have investigated the differences between enacting and imagining. Bäckman and Nilsson (1991) suggested that memories of enacting contain more perceptual details than memories of imagining. Zimmer and Engelkamp (1991) focused on the motor model of enacting, which imagining lacks. Distinguishing between enacting and imagining can be considered a kind of source monitoring. Source monitoring involves the set of processes involved in making judgments about the origins of memories, knowledge, and beliefs (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) . According to the source monitoring framework, source memory weakens more easily than item memory when distinguishing enacting from imagining (Johnson, 1997) . Therefore, when participants in our study were unable to use conscious memories about the recall test phase, the source memory dissipated, while the item memory remained. As a result, participants relied only on memory strength. Our study further clarifies the factors related to output monitoring errors. The implications of these findings point to future research directions. For example, more frequent imagining than enacting during the learning phase may increase the memory strength of imagining and produce different results. 
